Environmental Ethics as a Question of Environmental Ontology: Naess’ Ecosophy T and Buddhist Traditions

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Arne Naess included several references to Buddhist teachings in his ecophilosophy. I suggest an inquiry into and interpretation of the Buddhist sources of Naess’ proposal, in order to understand the role Buddhist elements play in it, and how they can offer a further understanding of central elements in Naess’ ecosophy. The focus is on the union of theory, worldview and practice, which lies at the core of both fields. A particular emphasis is placed on the idea that only a change of outlook on the nature of reality can promote an ethical transformation. In Naess’ approach, the ecological crisis is first of all a problem of our experience of the world, posing a question of ‘environmental ontology’. I suggest an hermeneutical approach primarily into early Indian Buddhist sources, and I argue that although a homogeneous ‘Buddhism’, as well as a ‘green Buddhism’ are problematic, different strands of thinking in Buddhist philosophy can facilitate the analysis of critical points also raised by Ecosophy T, supporting and expanding an ecosophical approach to ecological challenges.

All ‘formations’ (sanskāra) are impermanent. [...] Look into the self and discover that it is made only of non-self elements. A human being is made up of only non-human elements – the air, the water, the forest, the river, the mountains, and the animals. The Diamond Sutra is the most ancient text about how to respect all forms of life on earth, the animals, vegetation and also minerals. We have to remove the notion of human as something that can survive by itself alone. Humans can survive only with the survival of other species. This is exactly the teaching of the Buddha, and also the teaching of deep ecology.

Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching

Environmental Ontology

Responses to the intricacy of the current environmental situation, both on a local and global scale, are hardly a matter of rationally founded sets of prescriptions. As argued by different strands of radical environmentalism, 'a rethinking of both the meaning of humanity and the meaning of nature in which normative and ontological issues are at stake' is necessary. In Arne Naess' thinking, an effective change of attitude in individual behaviour and its political significance can only be achieved through a radical challenge to our dualistic view of the relationship between self and world, including some misconceptions of the divide between the two. Ecosophy T, as proposed by Naess, is a form of wisdom, in which ethics springs spontaneously from deeper inquiry and awareness concerning the relational nature of our selves and the world. For this reason, Naess suggests that environmental ethics are a matter of moving 'from ethics to ontology and back'. Without laying bare our basic assumptions about what natural objects are and our relation to them, the deepest concrete motivations for our decisions and policies remain obscure. No matter what metaethical approach we choose, those assumptions affect its efficacy, range of action and scope. According to Naess, two opponents may share the same ethical prescriptions, but eventually disagree on a decision of environmental character because the object of moral attention is perceived through radically different ontologies:

Confrontations between developers and conservers reveal differences in experiencing what is real. What a conservationist sees and experiences as reality, the developer typically does not see - and vice versa. A conservationist sees and experiences a forest as a unity, a gestalt, and when speaking of the heart of the forest, he or she does not speak about the geometrical centre. A developer sees quantities of trees and argues that a road through the forest covers very few square kilometres, so why make so much fuss? [...] The difference between the antagonists is rather one of ontology than of ethics. They may have fundamental ethical prescriptions in common, but apply them differently because they see and experience differently. They both use the term ‘forest’, but refer to different realities.

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2 Radical environmentalism is a label typically including deep ecology, ecofeminism and social ecology. For example, see Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, Toward an Ecocentric Approach (London: UCL Press, 1992) and Michael E. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
4 A clarification of terms: Naess distinguishes ecology ('the interdisciplinary scientific study of the living conditions of organisms in interaction with each other and with the surroundings, organic as well as inorganic'), ecophilosophy (the more general locus of debate about problems common to ecology and philosophy), and ecosophy, ('one’s personal code of values and a view of the world which guides one’s own decisions [...] applied to questions involving ourselves and nature'). Ecosophy T, then, is Naess’ personal ecosophical proposal, considered that many different ecosophies can support the principles of the deep ecology activist platform (Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 32-36).
5 Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 67, emphasis in original.
6 Arne Naess, ‘The World of Concrete Contents’, Inquiry 28:4 (1985), pp. 417-428, at p. 423, emphasis in original. I use the term ‘gestalt’ in the same way as Naess. In his writings, Naess tends to naturalise the word, which becomes part of his common vocabulary, losing the German capital letter and any foreign word emphasis.
Naess’ insistence on environmental ontology opens a critical inquiry into the tacit ‘ultimate premisses’ of our philosophical, religious or cosmological worldviews which, being generally implicit, need to be verbalised. Worldviews, in fact, yield ‘genetic relations’ with our value priorities and principles, namely ‘influences, motivations, inspirations and cause/effect relations’. On the basis of the latter, we shape our norms, lifestyles and policies with cardinal consequences in relation to the natural and to environmental issues. The starting point of his ecosophy can be summarised by the following passage: ‘I am for what I call a focus on environmental ontology, how you see the world, how you see it, how you can bring people to see things differently’.

Ecosophy and Buddhism

One of the most important philosophical challenges for Naess is the critical recognition of the relation between our own cosmology and our attitude towards nature. His analysis suggests that particular attention should be given to the acknowledgement of materialistic reductionism. Since the moment modern science became the dominant paradigm of reality, this kind of materialism has informed our worldview in a majoritarian way. Indeed, Naess’ ontological problematisation of our description of nature is directed against the idea that entities are objectively characterised only by the quantitative dimensions of physics. The natural objects, understood as material things-in-themselves, instead of relata revealed in the lived-world experience, condemn the subject to an irreconcilable separation from the world. At its core, ecophilosophical investigation still necessarily deals with our confidence in an ontological separation between self and world. Our view of a natural world as dead matter on which humanity applies the freedom of its spirit still appears to be widespread and dominant.

In this paper, I investigate Ecosophy T’s ‘ontological’ premises. These go in the direction of a relational understanding of self and world. However, ‘ontology’ assumes in Naess a looser and somehow improper meaning. It does not refer to a systematic study of Being, but rather to the question about ‘what there is’, that lies at the root of our sense of reality and our practical being in the world. I will, then, explore the philosophical aspects of Naess’ relationalism by drawing a comparison to different Buddhist teachings. Buddhism is one of Naess’ minor philosophical sources which shaped his environmental thinking (Spinoza and Gandhi representing the more evident sources).

9 For instance, see Naess, ‘The World of Concrete Contents’; ‘Ecology, Community and Lifestyle’, pp. 47-67. As explained later in this article, the connection between cosmology, concept of nature and physics is likely a Whiteheadian influence on Naess. For a critique of materialistic naturalism and the new theoretical situation it has informed since modern science, see also Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001 [1966]).
Resonances between Buddhist philosophy and deep ecology have often been evoked both by contemporary Buddhist scholars, especially in the field of Engaged Buddhism and by supporters of the deep ecological movement.\textsuperscript{11} Naess himself mentions them on more than one occasion.\textsuperscript{12} He also makes use of a recurrent formula, \textit{svabhāvān ṇīlśvaḥbhūtām} (all entities have no essence), possibly paraphrasing Nāgārjuna.\textsuperscript{13} There are also at least two specific papers in which Naess compares ideas from Ecosophy T to Buddhist teachings: ‘Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism’ and ‘Through Spinoza to


Mahayana Buddhism or through Mahayana Buddhism to Spinoza?’. I will specifically refer to ‘Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism’, because it contains Naess’ most significant comments on Buddhism regarding the nature of self and phenomena. In these sources, Naess mainly refers to Mahāyāna Buddhism: the Diamond Sutra and the Japanese philosopher Dōgen. There are also references to the Theravāda texts: Majjhima Nikāya and Dhammapada from the Pali Canon, the Visuddhimagga from Buddhaghosa. Deane Curtin includes the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna in his analysis of Naess’ Buddhist influences. Although lacking historical and textual precision, Naess’ constant interest in Buddhist philosophy can provide interesting and less established interpretations of the fundamental tenets of his ecosophy.

Some important remarks, however, need to be made. First of all, the very definition of a ‘Buddhist philosophy’ is an over-generalisation. There is no unitarian Buddhism. Different schools and traditions in time and regions can be very far one from another. Damien Keown uses the Buddhist metaphor of the elephant to suggest a simple definition of Buddhism itself: ‘it has a curious assembly of somewhat unlikely parts but also a central bulk to which they are attached’. With the term ‘Buddhism’, I will then refer to some basic ideas which can be traced back to early Indian Buddhism and which are accepted and developed in most later schools; in other words, ideas which can be said to belong to that ‘central bulk’. Otherwise I will provide context reference when taking into consideration peculiar developments belonging to particular traditions.

The possibility of identifying a Buddhist ecological attitude towards nature is similarly problematic. This difficulty has been highlighted by most, if not all Buddhist scholars commenting on ‘eco-Buddhist’ literature. As Lambert Schmithausen has shown

16 Even if critical about Naess’ references to Buddhism, Padmasiri De Silva recognises ‘a great sensitivity on the part of Naess that he should keep to the Buddhist stance as far as possible’ (Padmasiri De Silva, p. 130).
in his textual analysis of the crossroads of Buddhism and nature, the moral consideration of nature in Buddhism extends mainly to sentient beings. It also presents obstacles in the positive evaluation of the ordinary worldly dimension. These problems and many others should not be underestimated, but the gravity of these difficulties depends, among other things, on which concept of nature we choose to investigate. Through his concepts of ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘biospheric egalitarianism’, Naess dialogues with the established axiological approach to environmental ethics. I argue, nevertheless, that the nature of Naess’ environmental ontological questioning differentiates itself from the value approach of environmental ethics. The focus is not on the identification of criteria for moral considerability in nature, but on a different experience of nature and of our sense of reality. With this said, Naess’ ecosophy does not profit much from a simple comparison to Buddhist ethical norms and moral attitudes towards natural entities (although he mentions *ahimsa* (non violence) and compassion). A comparison to cosmological topics of Buddhist philosophy, namely those regarding to the nature of phenomena, is more fruitful since the problem raised by the ontological questioning is that of our description of nature itself.

As shown by Ian Harris, the very idea of nature is problematic in Buddhism because no direct parallel to the western ‘nature’ can be found there. He also suggests that, before delving into the Buddhist terminology, the western writer should clarify his or her own notion of nature, whether physical, metaphysical or aesthetic. Harris pokes here at a fundamental issue. The concept of nature is problematic not only in Buddhism, but also in the West. Naess does not provide a definition or a semantic field for it. He makes use of the Husserlian *Lebenswelt*, our lived world, or of vague expressions like ‘living beings in a wide sense of *bios’.* In other contexts he suggests that nature occupies


19 Some interpretations of *nirvāṇa*, indeed, can be considered world-rejecting; cf. Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature*, and Schmithausen, ‘The Early Buddhist Tradition and Ecological Ethics’.


22 Harris suggests a long list of terms that can render different aspects of the western ‘nature’: *samsāra, prakṛti, svabhāva, pratītya-samutpāda, dharmaśāhūya, dharmatā, dhammañjāti* (Ian Harris, ‘Buddhism and the Discourse of Environmental Concern’, pp. 380-381).

the place of the philosophical problems of world or reality. The problem is not fully thematised by Naess, but it exposes a fundamental and potentially contradictory issue since the modern idea of nature and materialistic reductionism are undermined by the reopening of the ‘environmental ontological’ question.

Suffering and Ignorance

The initial element I would like to explore is a movement from a moral issue to a problem of epistemology and worldview. This movement is the starting point of Naess’ ecosophy with his acknowledgement of the current crisis of life conditions on Earth.

Starting with Buddha’s earliest teachings, a similar movement can be read into the context of Buddhist philosophy. Suffering is the universal existential problem, a specific ethical theme, which quickly evolves into a problem of worldview, deeply rooted in the nature of our understanding of the world and life in general. The problem of suffering and the path towards liberation, which are expressed at the centre of all Buddhism, shed an interesting light on philosophical reasons and importance to approach the ecological crisis through a non-substantial thinking of self and phenomena.

From Naess’ ecosophical viewpoint, ecological concern lies not only with the acknowledgement of our environmental woes per se (such as resource depletion or biodiversity reduction, and the later climate change issue) as if environment was something merely external to us. This is what ‘shallow ecology’ represents. Naess stated this in his ground-breaking article which gave birth to the deep ecology movement in 1973. The on-going ecological crisis coexists along with an ethical and existential crisis, stemming from a degraded relationship to the natural world and to the world in general. As Naess points out, the concept of ‘crisis’ itself, as well as those terms describing environmental degradation, conveys an instinctive negativity. ‘Crisis’ cannot be considered a merely neutral descriptive term. It requires the admission of diminishing value, a loss and a negative impact upon the configuration of our life quality. Not only does crisis imply an ethical negative, but it also demands change. The change we need is not limited to technical solutions organised around the ‘man-in-the-environment’ view. Acknowledging the crisis from within a ‘relational, total-field image’ opens a new perspective onto a change in the paradigm of our self-representation within the natural world.

A widely acknowledged reading of the historical phenomenon of the ecological crisis underlines the role of an epistemology of dominion, turning domination into the ultimate meaning of the human enterprise. Modern nature separates itself from the subject, and is reduced to its mechanical structures. The materialistic reduction of nature into separate objects and the concurrent dualistic worldview, separating the subject from spiritless objectivity, is the theory that Whitehead designates as the dominant ‘cosmology

with which the European intellect has clothed itself in the last three centuries’. He describes it thus:

There persists [...] throughout the whole period the fixed scientific cosmology which presupposes the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter, or material, spread throughout space in a flux of configurations. In itself such a material is senseless, valueless, purposeless. It is this assumption that I call ‘scientific materialism’. Also it is an assumption which I shall challenge as being entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have now arrived.

Even though Whitehead wrote this lecture in the early twentieth century, it appears that the dominance of dualistic cosmology and its materialistic counterpart still bears relevance. As Hans Jonas points out,

[...] dualism itself represents so far the most momentous phase in the history of thought, whose achievement, however overtaken, can never be undone. The discovery of the separate spheres of spirit and matter [...] created forever a new theoretical situation. [...] Every conception of being that can come thereafter is in essence, not merely in time, postdualistic.

The critical understanding of how worldview determines responsibility and the practical relations to nature must also include the recognition of the covert role of general views or cosmologies. I refer to what Naess calls ‘total view’ or ‘Welt-und-Lebensanschauung’. He sees ‘a general orientation with concrete applications,’ providing a frame of consistency to our world and containing the complexities of implicit descriptive and prescriptive premisses, on the basis of which we make decisions and take action. Whitehead shows how the objects of modern science, for example the ‘newtonian trinity of matter, time and space’ crossed over from their specific field and became the paradigm of the objective description of reality:

This quiet growth of science has practically recoloured our mentality so that modes of thought which in former times were exceptional, are now broadly spread through the educated world. [...] The new mentality is more important even than the new science and the new technology. It has altered the metaphysical presuppositions and the imaginative contents of our minds. [...] This new tinge to modern minds is a vehement and passionate interest in the relation of general principles to irreducible and stubborn facts.

Science, as a singular and abstract concept, Science with a capital ‘S’, is a spiritual force, which scarcely corresponds to the concrete manifestations and practices of investigation.

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29 Ibid., p. 29.

30 Jonas, p. 16. This new theoretical situation implies what Jonas calls ‘the ontology of death’, in which ‘reality must turn into series of points juxtaposed in space and succeeding in time: points of extensity necessarily as external to one another as they all together are to consciousness’ (p. 20).


of the sciences. It generalises its objects and informs other cultural and historical manifestations. But the reciprocal movement is also neglected: indeed, the very development of science itself occurs within the bounds of broader and disparate movements of thought and concrete interests and actors. Whitehead writes: ‘Every philosophy is tinged with the colouring of some secret imaginative background, which never emerges explicitly into its trains of reasoning’. Naess, on his part, lays the blame upon an illegitimate generalisation and damaging reduction of scientific structures to the only admissible knowledge about the state of the world:

The cold detachment and brutality within the attitude of exploitation of nature has reduced the sensitivity towards the vastness of the perpetrated devastations, as well as the capability to confront systematically their deepest causes. They produced a negative effect on the human view of reality. Detachment from the rich and spontaneous experience of nature enabled certain abstract structures, or even the scientific models of those structures, to be arbitrarily accepted as the very content of reality. Our point of arrival was a false distinction between subjective and objective.

Conceding the impossibility of a single scientific worldview, Naess’ critique attacks a ‘social usage’ of the term ‘scientific’. ‘Scientific’ serves as a synonym for ‘objective’, uncritically carrying an ideological adherence to particular views of reality and dominant interests. This conformity, which restricts the ‘richness’ of experience and actions, has little to do with the specific purpose and apparatus of scientific fields. Problems arise when the instrumental excellence of scientific descriptions of the world are taken as the only objective knowledge. Still worse, they are regarded as a neutral descriptions or representations that serve the ground for subjective values and practices, for moral theories, as well as a model for general philosophy. The ‘false distinction between subjective and objective’ which Naess refers to, becomes then a fundamental epistemological issue, namely questioning how, as already alienated subjects, we perceive and know the world. Naess’ ecosophical proposal begins with a reference to Husserl’s Lebenswelt. The richness of our ‘spontaneous experience’ with its elements of meaning and value, is the locus of concreteness and non-duality. Letting go of any hypostatising attitude, we embrace ‘possibilism’ as a practical background of our world.

34 Whitehead, p. 18.
36 Naess insists on the idea that our ‘spontaneous experience’ envisages a far richer reality and number of relations than the restricted selection we tend to consider as ‘objective’. For example, cf. Naess, ‘Reflections on Gestalt Ontology’, p. 124. Cf. also Ecology Community and Lifestyle, p. 35: ‘An attempt is made to defend our spontaneous, rich, seemingly contradictory experience of nature as more than subjective impressions’.
descriptions. The subject-object dichotomy is called into question through a suspension of our prejudices on self and world:

Is not the value-laden, spontaneous and emotional realm of experience as genuine a source of knowledge of reality as mathematical physics? If we answer ‘yes!’, what are the consequences for our description of nature? The deep ecology movement might profit from greater emphasis on spontaneous experience, on what is called the ‘phenomenological’ outlook.38

Naess’ inquiry starts with a practical philosophical problem (what to do and why in the face of our ecological challenges), that soon unveils its correspondence to a crisis of meaning and of the existential locus of humanity in nature. This crisis cannot be addressed, except through an inquiry into our ontological assumptions.

A similar movement from the practical-existential problem of suffering to a questioning of our experience of reality is addressed in the very first Buddhist teaching of the Four Noble Truths. Although in its own context and terms, the Buddhist analysis of the problem of suffering can offer fruitful insights about this central point, viz. that we don’t address fundamental ethical problems through a change in prescriptions, but through a change in outlook.

The First Noble Truth states that everything is suffering (dukkha). Every aspect of life includes a form of mental or physical suffering. It is not a matter of pessimism, but a deep acknowledgment of the condition of all living beings. Liberation from sorrow becomes, then, the primary aim of Buddhist ethics and philosophy. Dukkha is not only psychophysical distress, but it is existence itself. Phenomena are dukkha because they are conditioned and relative, and these characteristics are precisely what our ignorance is of.39

In order to achieve liberation from suffering, the Buddha invites us to commence a personal journey to attain awareness and knowledge regarding the deep causes of suffering and the way to overcome it. The Second Noble Truth (samudaya), explains the arising of dukkha with craving (tanha) and passionate greed, which produce desperate attachment or clinging (upadana) to things as objects and essences,40 as if egos and objects were independent and separate things-in-themselves, something we can possess and define once for all. Clinging arises from ignorance, avijja: a view of reality which does not accept that phenomena, in their deep nature, are psycho-physical combinations, imperfect, insubstantial or impermanent. Avijja is not a general form of ignorance, but the ossification of views, opinions and conceptual constructions that cover our knowledge of

38 Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 32.
40 The formula names three categories of greed: (1) thirst for sense pleasures (kama-tanha); (2) thirst for existence and becoming (bhava-tanha); (3) thirst for non-existence and self annihilation (vibhava-tanha). (Cf. Rahula, loc. 781).
the Buddha’s predicament on free inquiry and the value of doubt. Buddhist philosophies all tend to refuse unconditioned belief and uncritical adherence to teachings and doctrines. Teachings cannot become themselves objects of attachment. The term saddha, faith, (skt. śraddhā) is certainly present in the Buddha discourses, but it appears to have a wider semantic field that includes the idea of trust, enthusiasm, confidence in the possibility of developing wisdom (p. paññā, skt. prajñā).⁴³

Environmental Ontology: Relationality and Not-self

According to Naess, the most important philosophical contribution that ecological science provides to our description of the world is the maxim ‘everything hangs together’. Through the maxim, ecology provokes our prejudices and reifications of nature to move towards a description of intrinsic relations between all things.

Interdependence within the ‘relational-total-field’ image of reality immediately brings up the necessity to review and abandon ‘certain conceptions about the status of “things”’.⁴⁴ Intrinsic relations determine identity. Such a suspension can only lead back to

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⁴² Cf. the renowned Kalama sutta: ‘It is proper for you, Kalamas, to doubt, to be uncertain; uncertainty has arisen in you about what is doubtful. Come, Kalamas. Do not go upon what has been acquired by repeated hearing; nor upon tradition; nor upon rumor; nor upon what is in a scripture; nor upon surmise; nor upon an axiom; nor upon specious reasoning; nor upon a bias towards a notion that has been pondered over; nor upon another’s seeming ability; nor upon the consideration, “The monk is our teacher.” Kalamas, when you yourselves know: “These things are bad; these things are blamable; these things are censured by the wise; undertaken and observed, these things lead to harm and ill,” abandon them’. (Kalama Sutta, Āṅguttara Nikāya, 3.65, edited and translated from the Pali by Soma Thera, Access to Insight (2013), available online at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/soma/wheel008.html (accessed 2014-03-06). Cf. also the words of the dying Sākyamuni to Ānanda. The Buddha reassures the disciple, worried that the young monk community will be left without a guide: the monks should be islands unto themselves (Maha-parinibbana Sutta, Dīgha Nikāya, 16, edited and translated from the Pali by Sister Vajira and Francis Story, Access to Insight (2013), available online at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.16.1.6.vajl.html (accessed 2014-03-06)). Another interesting element in this respect is the idea that the teachings are a raft that needs to be abandoned once the river is crossed. The raft theme will develop in the Mahāyāna doctrine of upāya kausīlaya, the doctrine of the skilful means, by which every theory or concept has purely instrumental soteriological function (cf. Michael Pye, Skilful Means: A Concept in Mahāyana Buddhism (London: Duckworth, 1978). Also, cf. the raft theme in the Pali Canon: Alagaddhāpimasutta, Majjhima Nikāya, 22; Mahātantrapākhānasutta, Majjhima Nikāya, 38; Suttonippātā, 1).


the world as spontaneously experienced, the *Lebenswelt*, which becomes the starting point of Naess’ environmental ontology. Before selection and analysis, concrete experience contains not only ‘primary qualities’ such as the geometrical, physical and chemical properties of entities but also Galileian ‘secondary qualities’ and even more complex qualities [tertiary], such as value and emotion. These, too, belong to the concrete contents of experience, so that nothing around us seems simply to have a neutral or ‘objective’ reality. Naess confronts us with an inversion: the extraction of abstract structures from experience is a perceptive and epistemological necessity. But the functional level of those abstract structures cannot be taken for reality. Naess writes:

The ontology I wish to defend is such that the primary properties (in a narrow sense) are *entia rationis* characteristic of abstract structures, but not contents of reality. The geometry of the world is not in the world.\(^{45}\)

The world, then, does not come as a collection of separate objects external to each other and external to the perceiving subject.

The world appears in ‘comprehensive totalities’, always in unique configuration, in ‘gestalts’. Naess’ gestalt ontology promotes the following idea: interrelated totalities which constitute the concrete contents of experience are not just a matter of perception. They are the only facts, inevitably including subjectivity. In contemplation or in action, Naess argues, ‘there is no epistemological ego reaching out to see and understand a tree or an opponent in a fight, or a problem of decision. A tree as experienced spontaneously is always part of a totality, a gestalt’.\(^{46}\) Concrete totalities are the only reality we can afford. They represent the living world. The ‘primary qualities’, commonly identifying things in themselves describing their essential spatial and material framework, are functional abstractions which do not tell us all that is important about the world, leading to ‘a conception of nature without any of the qualities we experience spontaneously’ \(^{47}\).

Identity appears to be a constellation of relations and conditions. The more we increase our ecological knowledge of the world, the more we acknowledge otherness as something identifying us, in which we can identify ourselves. The kind of identification Naess talks about is not merely psychological, but a recognition of processual, intrinsic determination of identity. In Ecosophy T, Naess’ systematic formulation of his ecosophy, the norm ‘Self-realisation’ stands at the top: the realisation of others’ interests - considering the Latin origin *inter-esse* - is the realisation of our expanded self. Subjectivity as ego leaves room for the ‘ecological Self’, a processual ever-changing relational identity. Nature is no longer a mere resource when we recognise how it constitutionally forms part of our self.

and \(B\) is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of \(A\) and \(B\), so that without the relation, \(A\) and \(B\) are no longer the same things. The total-field model dissolves not only the man-in-the-environment concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept - except when talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication’.


The conceptual structure of Naess’ gestalt ontology, as briefly recounted above, shows some extraordinary similarities in its fundamental tenets to the Buddhist general approach to phenomena and knowledge. Naess primarily ascribes the deep causes of our ecologic crisis to an epistemological root. Buddhist philosophy appraises that ignorance (avijjā), giving rise to clinging and suffering, is primarily responsible for a long chain of actions and attitudes leading to the very opposite of liberation.

‘Avijjā involves both cognitive deficiency and an “unfavourable attitude” or “prejudice”’ and is precisely a blinkered vision of the ‘true reality’ of things.48 Buddhism indeed acknowledges the existence of two levels of reality or truth: a common reality or conventional truth (sammutisacca), and an ultimate reality or absolute truth (paramattha saccā).49 While we conventionally use expressions naming individuals and beings, the entities seized by our perception and language are not ‘real’ in an absolute sense. If we look closely and freely at phenomena, we find that every dharma (element, phenomenon)50 is impermanent (anicca) and composed of infinite not-self factors. Instead of theorising a truth beyond appearance, when looking to things sub specie aeternitatis, Buddhism is strictly a-metaphysical.51 This attitude is explored through different meticulous phenomenological inquiries, that in ancient Buddhism focus mainly on personal identity, the ‘mine’, the ‘I’, and the ‘my self’. What today we could call the subject, the willing subject, longing for existence, is a concept that needs to be deconstructed. Early Buddhism does this mainly through two ways, one analytical and one synthetical.

The analytical way considers every being as an ever-changing combination of physical and mental factors, cognisable under five categories of aggregates. The pañcakkhandha (five aggregates) comprise:

1. Rūpa Form, material and sensible aggregates;
2. Vedanā Sensation, both physical and mental;
3. Saññā Perception and notion, which discriminates external objects;
4. Saṅkhāra Karmic and mental formations, depending on our past and environmental conditions (coefficients or co-agents);
5. Viññāṇa Conscience, the presence of an object to a subject.

49 The doctrine of the Two Truths represents one of the very first teachings of the Buddha. Although there have emerged some doctrinal differences in time and in schools, especially in Tibetan Buddhism, the teaching of different levels of knowledge of reality remains a fundamental universal Buddhist concept (cf. Philippe Cornu, Dizionario del Buddhismo, translated by Daniela Muggia (Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2003), pp. 182-184).
50 Sanskrit; the Pali equivalent is dhamma.
51 The silence of the Buddha can be considered a central topic regarding the nature of self. The refusal to give metaphysical answers and the care against dogmatic positions about the ultimate elements of existence was reworked in Mahāyāna Buddhism to address the substance of phenomena and the middle way between stating and abstaining to state. Cf. Ananda Sutta: To Ananda, Sānụṭṭha Nikāya, 44.10, translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Access to Insight (2012), available online at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn44/sn44.010.than.html (accessed 2014-03-06); Tirupattur Ramaseshayyer Venkatachala Murri, La filosofia centrale del Buddhismo, translated by Fabrizio Pregadio (Rome: Ubaldini, 1983 [1955]).
These five aggregates cover all kinds of perceived phenomena, and are said to be the basis of attachment. They describe, indeed, the deep nature of our experience. Ancient Buddhism is mainly preoccupied with refuting the false identification between aggregates and our very identity. When I look for my self, I see my material form (rūpa), but my form is not me. Form is not-self:

‘Bhikkhus, how do you conceive it: is form permanent or impermanent?’ — ‘Impermanent, venerable Sir’. — ‘Now is what is impermanent painful or pleasant?’ — ‘Painful, venerable Sir’. — ‘Now is what is impermanent, what is painful since subject to change, fit to be regarded thus: “This is mine, this is I, this is my self?”’ — ‘No, venerable Sir’.52

Rūpa comprises sensible, physical and material processes. Discontent, frustrated craving, fear of change and death are properly the effect of the instability, impermanence and insubstantiality of what we mistake for sensible stable beings. The same analysis holds for all the five khandha.53 Particularly remarkable is the inclusion of conscience (viññāna) among the five aggregates. We can find no self in the discriminating function of conscience. The dichotomy of subject and object is in itself only one of the ever changing, conditioned identities we mistake for the essence of our self. I, the self, things, persons are something we cling to, in the illusion of their duration and self-subistence. The attempt to hold what is impermanent gives rise to frustration and sorrow, so that the so-called ‘beings’ are designated as clinging-aggregates and are said to be, in themselves, dukkha.54

The synthetic way, in contrast, is the doctrine of patīcasamuppāda. In early Buddhism it describes the causal process of existence and its entanglement of mental and physical factors. In later developments of Buddhist philosophy, however, interdependent co-arising becomes more central and serves as a synonym of relativity, non-essentiality and vacuity (śūnya) of all things.55 Instead of essences and identities, we find multiple conditions. Conditions of things and things themselves become the same. Things arise conditioning and conditioned by multiple factors. The formula is recurrent in many of the Buddha’s speeches: ‘When this is, that is. This arising, that arises. When this is not, that is not. This ceasing, that ceases’.56 The interdependent co-arising refutes every linear conception of causality, and rejects the idea of cause and effect as separable events:

53 Ibid.
54 As mentioned before, in the Dhammacakkapavattanasutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya, 56.11, the Buddha lists the main examples of suffering and concludes saying: ‘In short the five aggregates of attachment are dukkha’. This alludes to the less ordinary and more philosophical meaning of dukkha which is not just a matter of ethics or psychology, but a character of phenomena themselves, a synonym for imperfection, impermanence, emptiness. Cf. Rahula, loc. 545.
56 Rahula, loc. 1287. Rahula also puts it ‘into a modern form: When A a is, B is; A arising, B arises; When A a is not, B is not; A ceasing, B ceases’. Cf. also, for example, Assutavāsutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya, 2.12.7.1, in Gnoli, La rivelazione del Buddha, Vol. 1, p. 100; Mahāvibhāsāsankhāyasutta, Majjhima Nikāya, 38, in Gnoli, La rivelazione del Buddha, Vol. 1, p. 32; Sālistambasūtra, in Gnoli, La rivelazione del Buddha, Vol. 1, p. 1306.
‘Cause and effect inter-are’\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, causes are traceable infinitely, environmentally, contextually and in time. The rise of phenomena is doctrinally explained with a circular chain of simultaneous cosmological and psychological factors:

And what is dependent co-arising? From ignorance [avijj\textsubscript{ā}] as a requisite condition come fabrications [sankh\textsubscript{ā}ṭaṇa, karmic co-efficients]. From fabrications as a requisite condition comes consciousness [vi\textsubscript{ñ}ṇ\textsubscript{ā}ṭaṇa]. From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form [naṭmar\textsubscript{ā}ṭaṇa]. From name-and-form as a requisite condition come the six sense media [saṭyāṭaṇa]. From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact [ph\textsubscript{ā}ṣaṇa]. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling [ved\textsubscript{ā}ṇa]. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving [tan\textsubscript{h}ā]. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging [up\textsubscript{ā}ḍaṭaṇa]. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming [bh\textsubscript{ā}raṇa]. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth [j\textsubscript{ā}ṭi]. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging and death [jaṭṭha]. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging and death [ja\textsubscript{ṭ}ṭha]. From aging and death [ja\textsubscript{ṭ}ṭha], sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair come into play.\textsuperscript{58}

According to the doctrine of paticcasamupp\textsubscript{ā}dā, all beings are considered to be conditioned (paticcasamupp\textsubscript{ā}ṇa) and conditioning (paticcasamupp\textsubscript{ā}dā) factors in such a radical sense that every single link (nid\textsubscript{ā}na) of the circle of causes cannot even be defined, except by mentioning it in its own conditionality:

[...] A certain monk said to the Blessed One: ‘Which aging and death [jaṭṭha], lord? And whose is this aging and death?’

‘Not a valid question’, the Blessed One said. ‘If one were to ask, “Which aging and death? And whose is this aging and death?” and if one were to ask “Is aging and death one thing, and is this the aging and death of someone/something else?” both of them would have the same meaning, even though their words would differ. When there is the view that the soul is the same as the body, there isn’t the leading of the holy life. And when there is the view that the soul is one thing and the body another, there isn’t the leading of the holy life. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathāgata points out the Dhamma in between: From birth [j\textsubscript{ā}ṭi] as a requisite condition comes aging and death’.\textsuperscript{59}

It is worth noting the prominent position ignorance occupies in nearly all the formulations of paticcasamupp\textsubscript{ā}dā. Consequently, for the Buddhist, a hypostatising look on reality is the primary cause of the very emergence of phenomena as conventional definite entities, subject to birth and death, trapped in the wheel of saṃs\textsubscript{ā}tra. Epistemological and ontological levels are not discernible when speaking from a non-conventional standing. There are no distinct discourses about the subjective conditions of knowledge and about reality itself. Speaking about the objectification of concrete realities is speaking about the subject, and vice versa. This kind of interrelated image of reality conveyed by the teaching of paticcasamupp\textsubscript{ā}dā, implies an idea of phenomena, both psychological and physical, as impermanent and empty of any substantial nature. Walpolah Rahula points

\textsuperscript{57} Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching, loc. 3231.


out that the five aggregates analyse the sense of self, while the interdependent co-arising constitutes its synthetic counterpart. Both of them generate not-self \([\text{anatt\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}]\) as a natural corollary.\(^{60}\) Initially connoting the absence of ego or soul within a definite psychological I, \(\text{anatt\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}\) subsequently indicates the fundamental non-being of all phenomenal selves.

On the fundamental character of not-self, Buddhism adopts a strictly a-metaphysical perspective. While refuting the existence of a substance lying unaffected under the turmoil of the ever-becoming surface of things, Buddhism also dismisses any nihilistic interpretation of \(\text{anatt\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}\). Significant in this respect is the silence of Buddha:

‘Now then, Venerable Gotama, is there a self?’
When this was said, the Blessed One was silent.
‘Then is there no self?’
A second time, the Blessed One was silent.\(^{61}\)

None of the answers - the Buddha explains later in the \(\text{sutta}\) - would have helped a non-trained mind to let the ‘knowledge that all phenomena are not-self’ arise. The concept of not-self is so central that the development of later Mahāyāna Buddhism not only maintains this exact same position, but focuses its theoretical attention on emptiness \((\text{ś\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)nyat\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)})\)\(^{62}\) as the true nature of everything existing.

Within this theoretical picture, early Buddhism states that the three basic characters of existence are impermanence \((\text{anicca})\), suffering \((\text{dukkha})\), and not-self \((\text{anatt\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)})\).\(^{63}\) Naess’ ‘Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism’ take into consideration the essential features I outlined while comparing gestalt ontology to the Buddhist philosophy of nature. Naess recognises objects as \(\text{entia rationis}\) under two profiles. On one hand, the concrete contents all have different degrees of impermanence. It is only the abstract structures which acquire a formal fixed identity, being outside experience. On the other hand, objects cannot be identified once and for all as separate, because they are only knots in the net of intrinsic relations. Naess respectively refers to the \(\text{anicca}\) and \(\text{anatt\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}\) characters. He then draws a parallel between Buddhahood and the concept of self-realisation, the supreme ethical norm of the Ecosophy T system. Many later Buddhist traditions, predominantly in the far East, consider the attainment of enlightenment and liberation a prerogative belonging to every living being. Every being participates in the Buddha Nature, the potential to be free from suffering and to realise one’s true nature. Here Naess raises an important point:

\(^{60}\) Cf. Rahula, loc. 1278.
\(^{61}\) Ananda Sutta.
\(^{62}\) The Sanskrit concept of \(\text{ś\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)nyat\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}\) has been widely explored by different philosophical schools and practiced through different meditation techniques. A first explanation of it, although heavily reductive, would be as follows: when we inquiry into the deep nature of an object, we can settle on no essence or conclusive definition of it.
\(^{63}\) Cf. Dhammapada, XX.277-279: ‘277. “All conditioned things are impermanent [\(\text{Sabbe sankh\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)r\(\tilde{\text{a}}\) anicc\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}\)]” — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering. This is the path to purification. 278. “All conditioned things are unsatisfactory [\(\text{Sabbe sankh\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)r\(\tilde{\text{a}}\) dukkha\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}\)]” — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering. This is the path to purification. 279. “All things are not-self [\(\text{Sabbe dhamm\(\tilde{\text{a}}\) dhamm\(\tilde{\text{a}}\) anatt\(\tilde{\text{a}}\)}\)” — when one sees this with wisdom, one turns away from suffering. This is the path to purification’. (Dhammapada, XX, edited and translated from the Pali by Acharya Buddharakkhta, \textit{Access to Insight} (2012), available online at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/dhp/dhp.20.budd.html (accessed 2014-03-06)).
It is not asserted that a tree defined solely by its primary or ‘objective’ qualities may attain Buddhahood. Rather, I assert that attainment of Buddhahood is only permissible for gestals, such as those that connect the tree with all qualities and attain semipermanence through recurring traits. In this passage Naess defines objects as *entia rationis*, whose concreteness can be found in semipermanent gestalt units, touching a very sensitive point in Buddhist philosophy: when seeing conditionality and relationality in everything, the individual (and its responsibility) does not fade away in the passive acceptance of any mystical dissolving unity. As mentioned earlier, Buddha teaches the self from the point of view of a Middle Way between nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) and substantialism (*sassatavāda*). What remains in the middle way, after rejecting both the extremes, is *tathatā* (suchness): a paradoxical point ever eluding every attempt of fixation or annihilation. As Naess points out, ‘the acceptance that all beings can attain Buddhahood depends upon the rejection of subject-object dualism,’ in favour of a view of things as processual, relational instant-events.

**Ethical Implications: Self and Others**

Ethical implications are considered by Naess to be a spontaneous, direct consequence or inherent aspect of his questioning of environmental ontology. Where beings fade, and leave room for concrete relations, everything appears dependent and conditioned. There is no master, no legitimate value holder subjectively projecting value on selected categories of beings. According to Naess, when we consider entities as concrete contents of experience, the separation of factual and value affirmations is no longer a valid basis for distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive statements. On the contrary, the designation of descriptive elements already implies evaluation within its complexity:

The tertiary qualities of things have an ontological status which is best expressed by complex relations. [...] In symbolic logic, a tree’s sombreness $S$ is represented by a relational symbol $S(A,B,C,D,...)$, where $A$ could be a location on a map, $B$ location of observer, $C$ emotional status of person, $D$ linguistic competence of the describer. There are formidable number of variables compared to technical height, $H(P,Q)$, where $P$ gives the number of units of height, and $Q$ the type of unit. Subjectivism need not to arise in either $S$ or $H$, if you are able to specify the exact context in which the quality occurs.

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64 Naess, *Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism*, p. 196.
65 ‘The concrete structure may have a lower or higher degree of permanence. The structure of an ecosystem may show notable change during a century or practically none. [...] The concrete contents of reality are shifting. Discontinuity and universal impermanence characterize the world of gestalts. Perhaps not quite in the sense of Buddhism, but in a closely related sense’. (*Ibid.*, p. 195.)
67 Cf. Naess on ‘suchness’, in *Ibid.*, p. 201. Concrete realities as relational instant-events are well documented in the poetic of Japanese Haiku, which can be considered one of the Zen Buddhist traditional arts. Naess, at p. 200, quotes the most famous Haiku poem from Matsuo Bashō: ‘Old pond / A frog jumps in / The sound of water,’ for its ‘high-level expression of a concrete content’ from the point of view of gestalt thinking.
Naess’ theory, then, considers value to be objective; a characterisation that has to be understood while constantly keeping in mind his notion of ‘objective’. Evaluative elements, entangled with emotional tones, belong to phenomena themselves.\textsuperscript{69} If spontaneous experience is also experience of value, the result is exactly as outlined in deep ecology: a horizontal, anti-hierarchical perspective where everything has intrinsic value, an ‘equal right to live and flourish’ just for the sake of being, or no value at all. But since we immediately experience value about ourselves and our loved ones, evaluation is not a projection process. Value appears to be the actual concrete experience of a complex quality of phenomena.

The kind of anthropocentrism challenged by the ecocentric perspective is the kind that thrives on the following assumption: humans, being the only subjects of any value assertion, are the only bearers of the right to decide and project value based on their own species and individual preferences or utility. The ‘relational-total-field’ disrupts the very possibility of a legitimate thinking in that direction, even when it implies humanistic or altruistic care for other entities. Ecosophical thinking means adopting a different phenomenological perspective. On one hand, ‘“objects” will then be defined in terms of gestalts, rather than in terms of heaps of things with external relations and dominated by forces. This undermines the subject-object dualism essential for value subjectivism’.\textsuperscript{70} On the other hand, \textit{subjects} are substituted by a processual concept of selves. The self Naess addresses is the relational and processual result of the dissolution of objects as things defined by material properties, in contrast to the subject as an observing and valuing consciousness. All kinds of properties are experienced in the world where the world is intended by gestalts. Value and meaning are not projected by the subject onto the world in a somehow arbitrary manner (whether cultural or individual). Traditionally considered subjective qualities are, then, part of the experienced world. The individual is better defined through a synthetic concept of self, which includes relations with her surrounding.

Self can shrink in an alienated ego dimension, or widen towards the ecological Self through a process of identification:

In the shallow ecological movement, intense and wide identification is described and explained psychologically. In the deep movement this philosophy is at least taken seriously: reality consists of wholes which we cut down rather than isolated items which we put together. In other words: there is not, strictly speaking, a primordial causal process of identification, but one of largely unconscious alienation which is overcome in experiences of identity.\textsuperscript{71}

The emphasis here is on the recognition of ‘self’ as inherently shifting and ever-processual. The awareness of the richness of our constitutive relations and

\textsuperscript{69} ‘[...] value statements are normally made with positive or negative feeling, and it would be nonsensical to ask for neutrality’ (\textit{Ibid.}, p. 64). Although Naess’ credit to Husserl is limited to the concept of \textit{Lebenswelt}, the argument against the subjectivity of value seems largely to the benefit of Husserlian intentionality and the idea that objectivity is value and meaning laden.


\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 262.
interdependence tallies a naturally and concretely shifting self-identity: ‘The self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 261.}

As I see it, ethical relation with otherness is implicated in a two-way street by this concept of relational identity. In one direction flows the genealogical side, for which we understand our identity as an expanded and fluid self, far beyond our skin suit. On this causal side, we understand both ourselves and all existing objects as a result of conditions and always in need, vitally dependent on surroundings and circumstances. On the other side flows the idea that every action we take has deeper and larger consequences than the ones we can calculate as relevant. We arrive at a further inversion. Dominion over a lifeless, valueless nature, is converted into a natural extension of responsibility in a potentially infinite way. The theoretical basis of either the idea of calculating the consequences for the other, or representing the other through criteria of moral considerability is lost.\footnote{For a clarification of the problems of the ‘moral considerability’ criterion, cf. the analysis of Thomas H. Birch, ‘Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration’, \textit{Environmental Ethics} 15:4 (1993), pp. 313-332.}

The responsible self is the ‘ecological Self’, which, in the act of realising itself, keeps shifting its self-representation, taking into account the flourishing of others, and making space to his inter-beings. A relational look is the only one providing effective personal motivations to take care of, and to be kind to, Earth. This is why Naess retrieves the Kantian notion of ‘beautiful action’: only a spontaneous, internalised decision can be called properly ‘moral’, no imperative has the power to do what ‘seeing’ things in a different way can.\footnote{Cf. Arne Naess, ‘Beautiful Action. Its Function in the Ecological Crisis’, \textit{Environmental Values} 2:1 (1993), pp. 67-71. In the article, Naess retrieves the pre-critical Kantian distinction between moral and beautiful actions. The keynote of the article is the statement that ‘acting from inclination is superior to acting from duty’. The remark supports the idea of identification following by a deepening of awareness and a change of outlook on the relational dimensions of reality.}

The Buddhist maximisation of respect and minimisation of harm, expressed for example by the virtue of \textit{ahimsā}, is found within a similar ethical implication, and it can be properly said to derive more from a reflection on ‘being’ than from one on ‘ought’. Buddhisms are first and foremost practical philosophies, where the soteriological problem intrinsically weaves the study of logic and reality with moral practice. As Keown points out, the goal in Buddhist philosophy ‘is not simply the attainment of an intellectual vision of reality or the mastery of the doctrine (although it includes these things) but primarily the \textit{living} of a full and rounded human life’.\footnote{Keown, \textit{The Nature of Buddhist Ethics}, p. 1. Emphasis in original.}

\textit{[i]Immoral conduct [...] comes about through a misapprehension of the facts (most fundamentally involving the belief in a self) together with an emotional investment made on the basis of that factual error (attachment to the imputed self). It is commonly assumed in connection with Buddhism that the fundamental problem is a simple lack of knowledge. This underestimates the power of the emotions to dominate and manipulate reason, to ‘drag it around like a slave,’ as Plato puts it.}\footnote{Ibid., p. 67.}
This perspective can highlight an ethical significance of knowledge that in Naess tends to maintain the necessity of rational argumentation. The insufficiency of theoretical knowledge for the attainment of liberation is the reason for the recurring idea that wisdom must be practised through right mindfulness. The ancient ethical path for liberation from dukkha, the Noble Eightfold Path expounded in the Fourth Noble Truth is composed of three main areas, namely paññā, sīla, samādhi: wisdom, ethics and meditative concentration. These are mutually intertwined. Furthermore, the path itself begins with the first step of ‘right view’ (samma diṭṭhi), a change of perspective on reality which concurs with a change of attitude. ‘Right cognition is successful cognition, that is to say, it is cognition followed by a resolve or judgement, which is, in its turn, followed by a successful action’.

It is also worth considering the weaving of worldview and practice in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in which the tradition of the Noble Eightfold Path leaves room for a special focus on the pair prajñā, (wisdom) and karuṇā (compassion) as the complementary features of the spiritual path of the bodhisattva (the future enlightened one). Aspects of the Mahāyāna’s understanding of compassion, especially in Mādhyamika philosophy, can further the interpretation of philosophical aspects of Naess’ identification which are less explored but worth mentioning. As Naess observes: ‘compassion extended to all beings implies ‘seeing oneself in all things’, a process of identification. Without this, things appear foreign, devoid of life, and impossible as objects of compassion’.

Comparable to the ecosophical concept of ‘identification’, the Buddhist compassion (karuṇā) arises spontaneously when anicca and anatta are truly seen. In Naess the overcoming of the subject/object dichotomy removes the ethical separation of altruism and egoism by refuting the ontological separation between ego and other (alter in Latin). Similarly, already in early Buddhism, the awareness of impermanence and interdependence generates the capacity to see yourself in others, and see others in you. ‘When watching after oneself, one watches after others. When watching after others, one watches after oneself’. This celebrated passage from the Pali Canon, however, cannot be mistaken for a mere suggestion of voluntary solidarity (anukampa). Compassion is a universal, object-free attitude, stemming from the deep understanding of the true nature of being, of the universal character of dukkha and of the interrelatedness connecting all beings with my self.

In Mādhyamika philosophy, compassion occupies an interesting philosophical place. The Sanskrit term samsārti, reality conventionally seen, means that everything exists conditionally, relative and void of essence. Things are relative and therefore empty. In terms useful to our discussion, we can say that, within this view, establishing value in

77 See again the teaching of Benares, or Dhammacakkavattanasutta, Saṃyutta Nikāya, 56.11. The eight steps of the Noble Eightfold Path are: (1) Right view (samma diṭṭhi); (2) Right intention (samma sankappa); (3) Right speech (samma vāca); (4) Right action (samma kammanta); (5) Right livelihood (samma ājīva); (6) Right effort (samma vāyāna); (7) Right mindfulness (samma sati); (8) Right concentration (samma samādhi).

78 Naess, Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism, p. 196. Emphasis in original.

relation is impossible. The Sanskrit term *prajñā* is seeing, realising the *śūnyatā* (emptiness) of everything in existence. At the same time, the counterpart of *prajñā* is *karunā*, compassion. *Karunā* is the worldly virtue *par excellence*, for example expressed in the bodhisattva resolution to delay the ultimate liberation to help liberate all beings. *Śūnyatā* is not a mere vision, a theoretical conquest, but it conveys a practical-existential attitude. The eradication of ego and its attachment does not lead to disinterest or moral detachment, but to compassion for all beings, finally seen as empty, relative, and trapped in suffering.

We can successfully interpret Naess’ identification as intended to maintain the movement of continuously re-entering relations, or different gestalt configurations. Relationality and identification entail a questioning of one’s self-identity through wider and further dimensions of meaning and otherness. This interpretation emphasises the exercise of avoiding the hypostatisation of the subjects of the relation itself. In addition, this reading can clarify a difficult criticism, often raised against relationalist positions, which would not account for the implication of responsibility and care for others that follows from a relational view. In the type of wisdom required to suspend the reification of the relational terms lies the ethical aspect of relation. Wisdom as implied in ecosophy cannot be merely and conclusively replaced by the enforcement of a normative system. Without wisdom there is no morality. Wisdom has to do with the capacity to suspend the objectification and the fixed representations of others, letting others emerge, and allowing more and more relations to occur.

Concluding Remarks

As is now clear, the arguments and terminology of ecosophy and Buddhist philosophies do not completely overlap. Nevertheless, a comparison with a heterogeneous number of Buddhist sources is useful for understanding the horizon within which some of Naess’ statements are placed. This is because a reopening of the discussion about the nature of phenomena is in play in both cases. Further interpretation of Buddhist sources also helps to problematize central issues raised by the ecosophical approach to environmental challenges. The Buddhist traditions, then, can offer a strong case for adopting this approach as valid and fruitful.

Among the fundamental ecosophical issues that can be addressed through the lens of Buddhist doctrines are the emphasis on the change of outlook and our sense of reality in the face of practical and existential crisis; a relational and conditioned understanding of all phenomena and the need to avoid clinging onto essences and definitions; a relational understanding of the personal self; compassion or identification.

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82 See Murti, and Magno.

83 Cf. Ives.

84 This aspect recalls the stress in some climate change social research on the ‘ability to change paradigms’ as the most important leverage point for climate change adaptation. See Karen O’Brien, ‘The Courage to Change: Adaptation from the Inside-Out’, in *Successful Adaptation: Linking Science and Practice in Managing Climate Change Impacts*, edited by Susanne C. Moser and Maxwell T. Boykoff (Routledge: London, 2013).
as spontaneous outcomes of the acknowledgement of this relationality, also to be understood as requiring continuous questioning of the pattern of relations we take to define ourselves.

In order to open new ways to face our current environmental and climate challenges, meaning and value need to remain a continuous ethical quest of the greatest intersubjective importance. Without this kind of wisdom and compassion for others, no normative prescriptions can produce any change in our treatment of ecological issues.

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